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French School at Athens
According to Voltaire, one of the main func-
tions of the philosophy of history was to be
critical. It seeks to attest the truth of facts
against prejudices, to demystify the estab-
lished dogma by revealing its genesis, and
to show on a worldwide scale the eman-
cipation of the human spirit. On this last
point, the critical tradition of the Aufklärung
undoubtedly provided new ground for re-
flection within which the philosophy, now
emancipated from the ancient metaphys-
ics of history and its theological presup-
positions, managed to develop. And yet,
if philosophy provided an ontological dig-
nity to history, which was hitherto excluded
from its own field and timeless perspec-
tive, it was always with the idea to submit
it to a transcendent view. In Voltaire’s time,
the philosopher still read history in order 
to obtain, behind the tangible reality of
the facts, confirmations of his own postu-
lates. Later with Kant, history was mostly
reduced to the apparent manifestation
of a “hidden plan of nature”, while Hegel
referred to it as a “ruse of reason” which
expresses itself through human passions.
In this respect, historicism constitutes a
decisive stage in the critical use of history
by philosophy. First, it tends to distance
itself from the ancient metaphysical con-
ceptions, and secondly, it offers a radical
refoundation of the thought by considering
its own historical assumptions. But if the
philosophy of history has claimed, from its
beginning, to be critical, its reflexivity has
remained, however, speculative. History is
just confirming what it presupposes in ad-
vance. On the contrary, historicism intends
to submit the philosophical gesture to its
own reflexivity. And unlike the Hegelian










philosophy of history, it opts for a reflexivity which does not try to relate the historical facts to a 
pregiven totality, but to confront its own assumptions on history. It seeks to shed light on what 
conditions and precedes its own critical gesture.
I would like, in this article, to explore some of the philosophical historicist paradigms put for-
ward in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by German scholars. I will mainly 
focus on the Diltheyan project of a “critique of historical reason”, Ernst Troeltsch’s “reflexive 
historicism”, and the “destructive” approach suggested by Martin Heidegger. The object will be 
to underline the specificity of the relationship between philosophy and history and the criti-
cal use it generates, while questioning its limits, its diversions and what still binds it to the 
former metaphysical conceptions of history. If the recourse to history unmistakably implies 
a critical perspective within philosophical investigations, an aspect by which the philosopher 
aims to demystify and to exceed appearances, what can be said of an approach which claims to 
be “metahistorical” and to exceed the empirical status that serves as a scientific guarantee for 
historians? And what can be said of the motto “to overcome history with history”? Does it imply 
the same hubris, originally present in the discipline, which pushes its reflexivity to the limits 
of sacrificing its own criticism, or does it imply an extreme form of reflexivity which would be 
capable of enhancing the historian’s work?
From the philosophy of history to historicism
It was against the theological conception of history (Geschichtstheologie) that philosophy began 
to flirt with history. The objective was less the rejection of its vision “from on high”, as Bossuet 
formerly tried, than to think of it in the immanence of the same continuous and unified process. 
The gesture of the philosophy of history aims to integrate into the philosophical system that 
which seemed, from the very beginning, to have been excluded from it: the continuous change 
in time and history. The thought had initially excluded these aspects as being contingent and 
secondary in comparison to the domain of essences it seeks to reach. At the same time, what 
we call “history” began to form a reflexive unity and a space of autonomous meaning when it 
started to free itself from the external influences that ruled its existence, the most powerful be-
ing the one of God. If it remains a prisoner of its surface effects, it is the duty of mankind to think 
of its deployment, and in doing so, to let the finite consciousness rethink itself in the light of what 
exceeds it. By bringing to light the historicity of thought through the genealogy that he provided 
of consciousness and its progress towards the full universality of absolute knowledge, Hegel 
was one of the first scholars to integrate such a reflexivity into his system. Time is no longer 
thought as an a priori and unconditional frame, but as an integral part of the knowledge process 
and one of the conditions of its effectiveness. And the very way the consciousness thinks its own 
historicity allows it to reflect on itself and to be assured, through this reflexivity, of its concrete 
contents and effectiveness. A privileged moment of the system, history can nevertheless only 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 06:33:51 |
40
The Uses and Misuses of Historical Reflexivity in Philosophy
be integrated if it can be maintained within certain boundaries. And if philosophy turns to history, 
it must treat it as a material that it reconstructs at will and a priori.1
It is precisely in opposition to the speculative presuppositions underlying the “Hegelian shape” 
of the philosophy of history that historicism appeared in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. This appearance represents a formal gesture of emancipation, as we find it in particular in
the jurisprudence of Friedrich Carl von Savigny which seeks to enhance the local, the individual
and the historical singularities over the universalist and jusnaturalist conceptions which were 
hitherto prevalent. It is the same gesture that appears in the literature of Gustav Schmoller and 
David Friedrich Strauss. The former tried to break with the purely a priori economic perspec-
tive, traditionally that of classic political economy, while the latter contributed by criticising and 
questioning the established dogma of the Bible with his historically based biography of Christ. 
From a speculative philosophy of history to historicism, it is possible to observe a radicalisa-
tion of the critical standards. It is not only a matter of thinking the whole of history from the 
perspective of a finite consciousness, but to assume the finitude of this consciousness, and, by 
assuming it, to accept the abandonment of any transcendent point of view. According to Ranke, 
if the historian has to raise himself above the consideration of the individual towards a universal 
view, which allows the historian to seize the objective coherence which transmits history, he 
will only be able to deal with histories and not the history.2 Droysen radicalised this gesture by 
showing that the historical fact has nothing objective but depends on a whole process of inter-
pretation. Dilthey’s perception, for his part, is even more radical. By reflecting on itself, historical 
consciousness informs us that universality exists only according to the sense we gave to it, and 
truths only within the limits of the point of view from which they were built.3 The “Aufklärung of
the Aufklärung”,4 as it could have been called, historicism adds to the reflexivity of the Enlighten-
ment, which emerged in reaction to ancient theological dogma and tried to build a philosophy of
history with a universal claim. Historicism is a philosophy of history which broke with the He-
gelian attempt to seize the global sense of history and accept itself as resolutely finite. In other 
words, it is a philosophy of history neither metaphysical nor speculative, but eminently critical 
and reflexive: a reflexivity “of the second degree”5 which not only aims to think the finitude in the 
light of a totality which exceeds it, but also to draw its conditions of possibility, in the lineage of 
Kantian criticism, which are themselves totally historical. It is what Odo Marquard described as 
a historical philosophy which abandoned the former philosophy of history (Philosophie der Ges-
chichte nach der Geschichtsphilosophie),6 distinguishing the philosophy of history as a historical
formation and the discursive way we think in general about history and its own conditions of 
possibility.
The Diltheyan project of a “critique of historical reason” 
It has been in reaction to this speculative and metaphysical problematic that many philosophers,
from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, positioned themselves by claiming a specific rela-
tionship with history which, if not reduced to the empirical or factual investigation undertaken by 
historians, refuses the transcendent position which is traditionally attributed to the philosophy
of history. Wilhelm Dilthey was, in this respect, one of the first to bring, in the lineage of Hegel, 










philosophy to reflect on its own development. He was also one of the first to introduce a real 
“self reflection” (Selbstbesinnung) within philosophy’s own relationship to history. It is the aim 
of what he calls, in his Introduction to the Sciences of the Spirit (1883), a “Critique of Historical 
Reason”, which he defined as a critique of the way that mankind can know himself, society and 
history.7 Based on history and on historical analysis, such a project sought to radicalise the Kan-
tian paradigm, by reflecting on the critical thought itself by bringing it back to a dynamic histori-
cal process which allows for the deepening of the consciousness of the limits of our knowledge 
such as it appears from a historical standpoint. For the philosopher who becomes a historian, 
this notion involves using all the means available from existing historical knowledge and work, 
going back to the real conditions of the consciousness and its presuppositions such as we can 
find them in a dynamic historical process. The critique should not only help the philosopher to 
acquire the pure forms of knowledge, as it is the case with Kant, but should also enable the 
bringing to light of all the historical presuppositions which underlie any process of knowledge.
Thinking the transcendental within its empirical genesis, with the idea of seizing a “historical a 
priori”, deepens and indeed goes beyond the Kantian perspective. This also means, in a sense, 
to radicalise the critique towards an absolute archaeology or genealogy of knowledge. The per-
spective is at once diachronic and fundamental. The unitary principle that Hegel presupposed
a priori can thus be put to the test of the facts. In an attempt to look for the ultimate foundation 
to rebuild the human sciences, Dilthey reached for the historicity of the lived experience that 
underlies pure reason, what he called the “historical experience of life” (historische Lebenser-
fahrung). This experience constitutes the first ground from which the thought precisely arises 
and which it cannot exceed.8 Kantian reflexivity – which gave reason a sense of its own limits – is 
thus incited to reflect on itself fully, but this time in the direction of what historically determines 
it in an approach that is no less transcendental than hermeneutical. This approach consists of 
starting with the life expressions, no matter how discursive or theoretical they are, in order to 
come back to the lived experience which underlies them. As far as it can help us with our self 
reflection and the possibility of grasping this first lived experience, the psychology lying at the 
core of Dilthey’s approach plays a prominent role in understanding the genesis of symbolic and 
cultural processes as well as comparing various world visions. By thinking about its own situ-
ation, by drawing the structures which are carried out in it, and by putting into perspective what 
comes to it in an immediate way, the consciousness manages to reach a higher and eminently 
more critical reflexivity than the speculative one proposed by the Hegelian philosophy of his-
tory. Although referring to history, the reflexivity implemented by Dilthey serves an eminently 
fundamental perspective: it is now through history that Dilthey wants to seize the lived ground 
thought by psychology, and in a sense “to overcome history with history” in the way it would 
later be proposed by scholars such as Friedrich Meinecke, Ernst Troeltsch or Martin Heidegger.
“To overcome history with history”: a historicism of the second degree
Troelsch’s conceptual framework is interesting in many aspects. It marks a brand new stage 
in the attempt made by philosophy, in the early nineteenth century, to look further into its own 
critical reflexivity. Praising the value of the “immanent critique” implemented by historians, 
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which allowed him to comprehend any period from its own temporality and history, Troeltsch 
suggested pushing this reflexivity to its limits in the direction of what he called a reflexive and 
“renewed” historicism.9
If we no longer understand the temporal frame or historical object from some transcendent
principle, this comprehension is intrinsically bound to the context in which the historian lives. 
As Troeltsch underlines, the action of choosing and elaborating criteria from which an epoch 
is understood draws its essence from a certain “context of existence”, an extrinsic frame of 
reference. So, shedding light on the assumptions of the historian’s own gesture does not only 
imply an awareness of the historicity of his own approach or to reinsert this object into a specific 
context: bringing to light the historicity of the historic approach is indeed one thing, but to extend 
and deepen the reflexive process which makes this historisation possible is another. Indeed, the 
latter action provides the tools to integrate a “second-degree reflexivity”, within which the ap-
proach aims not only to relativise its object, in the light of a given situation, but to reflect on the
situation itself. As Troeltsch specifies, it is necessary that every period that undertakes reflective 
actions towards history interprets the unity of sense of the whole from its own context, as this 
context itself represents an important part of the whole. In other words, it needs to consider 
what determines it and, at the same time, what exceeds it, two aspects on which the psycho-
logical approach unfortunately does not have a grip.
Thus, in order to avoid the arbitrariness of an unclarified position, Troeltsch intends to develop
a more reflective position than the one reached by Dilthey. Where Dilthey omits the historical 
presuppositions that underlie his own psychological approach and typology of worldviews, Tro-
eltsch seeks to assume fully the finitude and the partiality of his own conceptual framework. 
The situation in which the historian’s work is linked must indeed be enlightened, not only at 
the level of a generation or an epoch, as proposed by Dilthey, but in the light of a wider histori-
cal context seen at the scale of the “united sense of the totality” of humanity – basically, at the 
level at which the philosopher should work. As Troeltsch recognises, what is at stake here is a 
philosophy of history in the full sense of the term, one which seeks to extend historical science
by radicalising its own reflexive gesture. The goal is to clarify the main criteria – mostly implicit 
and unquestioned – on which the historical research bases itself, and to enlighten the present’s
imperatives in light of past history. In this form, the philosophy of history constitutes, according
to Troeltsch, a necessary counterpart to the historian’s gesture. By revealing a continuity and 
a unity from which a comparison may be implemented between the present situation and the 
past, or moreover, between a distant and foreign culture, the philosophy of history provides a 
greater reflexivity to the discipline.
This new philosophy of history proposed here by Troeltsch has thus nothing to do with a purely 
contemplative and panoramic philosophy. It aspires to be committed, firmly “activist”, and half-
way between the empirical history from which it originates and the political project of “cultural 
synthesis” which comprises its destination. Its last criterion is thus neither transcendent nor 
external to its own context. It is based on “the inner experience and the personal commitment” 
and promotes a philosophical reflection carried by a critical self-reflexivity, which is supposed
to protect it from any arbitrariness.










This project involving a new “synthesis”, a “construction” (Aufbau), should thus make it possi-
ble, while “overcoming history with history”, to find within history a sure and stable principle as 
well as the tools that would allow us to think more deeply about our culture. It should provide 
the key to generate new impulses drawn from the values and “the most precious trends of the 
past”.10 Here, Troeltsch takes on the reflexive requirement, which allows the historian to avoid 
dogmatism and to relativise his own position. But according to him, the philosopher should go 
beyond this point. The philosophy of history should not contend itself with clarifying the presup-
positions which underlie historical work. Indeed, if its task is initially to consider the values and 
the criteria on which the historian bases his own work, the philosophy of history is thus not 
purely descriptive. It participates in reaching the conclusion of an eminently creative mission, 
which is “to acquire a criterion, an ideal, and an idea of the new cultural unity which should be 
created for every present situation, and understood, at the same time, as a whole and as the 
result of processes occurring over several millennia”.11 Thus, his project of synthesis focuses 
less on the transmission of a content that needs to be reactivated than on the “continuous struc-
turing” (of criteria, ideals, ideas) from which our worldview is edified and developed. Working 
with the values that are already in place within the different totalities of western history, it aims 
to structure the various strata of our culture in order to offer a new impulsion to the present. In 
being conducted according to the way each age understands itself, the appeal to history serves 
a reflexivity which is not only critical, but eminently constructive. However, it is only if we seek a 
mutual conditioning and complementary relation with our past – which lets us integrate the effi-
ciency of our own reflexivity into the creative power of knowledge – that we can be, as Troeltsch 
explains, free again to operate a selection of what appears to us to be especially significant in 
the effective course of history. Or, in other words, we shall be able to rewrite history freely from 
our own present and contribute to the self-conscious appropriation of our era.
Critique as a “systematic deconstruction of tradition”
Heidegger, for his part, considers Troeltsch’s reflexivity concept as insufficient. Through his de-
structivist paradigm, he suggests bringing the critique to a further level, not only by implement-
ing a reflection on the self, the knowledge of the situation and of the conditions imposed by his-
tory, as Troeltsch had already proposed, but also by developing a “systematic deconstruction of 
the tradition”. Thought as destruction, the critique is here more radical. It does not seek, as with 
Troeltsch, to elucidate what is conditioning us – which is more incumbent on historiography or so-
ciology – but to expose the historical way through which we appropriate that history. The critique 
which results from the concrete implementation of this destruction does not target the fact that 
we generally locate it in a tradition but, rather, the way in which we are doing it. This movement, as 
Heidegger would later explain, consists in a positive return to the past in the sense of a productive 
reappropriation: a movement that allows philosophy to become more aware of its own limits, the 
theoretical and conceptual for example, and the limits of what conditions its relation to history. 
Heidegger’s destructivist paradigm should allow, through the deconstruction of different layers 
of meanings, to fluidise sense, to unblock access to it and to liberate it in order to make possible 
a dynamic and actual reappropriation of tradition. Deconstruction has hence the task to elucidate 
the concrete pregiven categories, to condemn the dominant and accepted meaning as well as to 
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reveal the hidden motifs, implicit tendencies and ways of interpretation, in favour of a deconstruc-
tion that would help penetrate the original sources that served as motifs for the elucidation. It is 
in that sense, he adds, that philosophy can become “‘historical’ knowledge in a radical sense”.12
The destructive paradigm put forward by Heidegger is therefore eminently critical. The recourse 
to history does not only occur within the optic of a return to the past, but offers also the pos-
sibility to hold a critical debate towards traditions that would avoid the transplanting of a fatal
prejudice to the understanding of the present. As Heidegger writes, destruction does not refer 
to a denial of the past: its critique concerns the present and the dominant way of treating his-
tory. Against this “dominant vision” which consists, according to Heidegger, in objectivising what 
is at first a lived experience (Erlebnis), the philosophical destruction allows us to question the 
authenticity of our relation with history and aims therefore to put aside the mediations which 
are blocking our access to it.
However, it does not suffice to renounce or to ignore tradition. First, because the original expe-
rience was not given to us as a whole and must be reappropriated in light of our present, and 
then, because our way of thinking, conceptualising and defining is rooted in a complex heritage, 
inherited from the Greeks, which has circulated through a chain of heterogeneous interpreta-
tions. This critical movement should thus occur in two steps. The first one concerns our own 
situation and the different ways to broaden its horizon of interpretation. Here Heidegger refers 
to “a hermeneutical critique of the situation”, which provides the advantage of rendering clear 
the prepossessions and preconceptions of the research, namely its theoretical and conceptual
assumptions. Every philosophical elucidation, no matter how radical it may be, starts from the 
beginning and remains penetrated by inherited concepts and, consequently, by unquestioned 
horizons and perspectives.13 All these concepts, Heidegger says, lost their original expressive 
function, the ground of the experiences in which they rooted, and gradually gained their au-
tonomy from the original context. Every transfer entails thus attrition. It is only by retracing its 
filiations that we can access the primordial sense which emerged in that history. Therefore, the 
critique, initially deployed to clarify the concepts and the horizon within which it operates, ulti-
mately ends in the “historical destruction of the history of philosophy”.14
Thus, it is only once our theoretical and conceptual assumptions are made intelligible that an 
authentic reappropriation of the past can take place. It is what makes possible the second step 
of the critique, known as “repetition” (Wiederholung). In fact, there is no question here of “repeat-
ing” or reiterating what Plato and Aristotle had thought, nor to pretend to access the ultimate 
psychical structure which underlies real life, as Dilthey suggested. Destruction is not just an 
instrument aiming to provide an access to preestablished meanings. Going back to the tradi-
tion concerning the “original meaning” does not necessary mean to locate a “start”. But through 
an authentic comprehension, it should seek to liberate the possibility of an authentically lived 
sense and to reappropriate a tradition reflexively. Repetition is thus neither a restitution of the 
“past”, nor a posterior connection of the present with what is “done” and “accomplished”. It is a
lively and creative reappropriation of tradition which, in that sense, constitutes the only way to 
reach an authentic historicity for Heidegger, as he argued in Being and Time.15










The destruction under critique
Even though it is erected on the noble principle of clarifying the presuppositions that underlie 
our relation with history and tradition, the “destructivist paradigm” proposed by Heidegger is not 
without its critique. To what extent does his approach lead us to the same false routes identified 
in the approaches of other philosophies of history? And no matter how radical the critique as-
sociated with it is, does it not rely on assumptions which themselves are never exposed to the 
critique? To what degree can the critical movement elucidate its own assumptions? What is the 
legitimate limit of what we could call a “metahistorical” use of history?
Here, the recourse to history is not only critical but also subjected to an authentic ambition to 
refound philosophy. But to succeed, it has to return to the authentic relationship it once had with 
its own object allegedly falsified or lost during its history. In Heidegger’s thought, what justifies 
destruction is the fact that tradition, instead of making accessible what is transmitted, conceals it 
and, more often, blocks access to the original “sources” from where the categories and the tra-
ditional concepts were drawn in an authentic way. Against the oblivion to which he says history 
contributes directly, Heidegger favours the lived historicity, the only notion which can make pos-
sible a veritable repetition or an authentic reappropriation of tradition. A decade later, Heidegger 
would contrast the authentic history with what he calls literally “nonhistory” (Ungeschichte),16 that 
he assimilates into the factual and local history judged nonauthentic enough in comparison to 
what takes place at a deeper level, from the vaster point of view of “the history of Being”.
The Frankfurt school has accurately stressed this metahistorical use of history by demonstrat-
ing how it substituted real history, made with “sweat and tears”, through a quasi-mythological 
reconstruction of an authentic historicity. Certainly, evenemential history is no longer thought of 
as being related to a transcendence that is embodied within it, and thus has gained in effective-
ness. In the form of a reversed Hegelianism, history is always understood from the successive 
imprints left by the being, the various modalities of the opening up of the world, appearing within 
which Heidegger sees the founding event (Ereignis) of any history, but which never shows itself 
as such. It seems in this case that philosophy allows itself many extrapolations from which the 
historian, even the one working with longue durée phenomena, denies, referring to tangible 
sources. So then, what are the means to avoid and safeguard against such an use of history, 
especially when this history is in competition not only with the history constructed by histo-
riography but with the lived history, considered as superficial, as opposed to a deeper, more 
authentic or secret one?
First of all – even if this remark may seem obvious to historians – there is a need to abandon 
every ontological postulate. Itself historical, philosophical reflexivity cannot pretend to access 
what is history as a whole or as a totality (i.e., as a history of progress, decline, etc.). It can only 
focus on our relation with history, the way that we live it, write it and think it. In other words, it 
focuses on the various modalities of historical reflexivity itself, and on its discursive forms and 
concepts. The critical movement appears legitimate in so far as it allows for a radicalisation of 
the work of the historian concerning the conditions and the possibilities of historical discourse, 
and for a shedding of light on the historical assumptions of the reflexivity that he implicitly uses. 
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Furthermore, it seems necessary to critique the criterion of the historical critique itself in order 
to avoid any hypostasis and panoptical positioning. By interrogating his own postulates, the phi-
losopher meets the historian, who equally deploys his reflection based on the results produced 
by empirical history. Historical reflexivity should thus accept its own exposition to critique.
Finally, if philosophy renounces the thinking of history in terms of progress or decline and re-
jects the univocal and teleological reading of history, then philosophers should recognise some 
kind of polytheism and the simultaneity and coexistence of a plurality of historical horizons or 
regimes of historicity. In that case, the philosophical gesture confines itself, with more humility, 
to the implementation of a critical reflexivity, which shall return not only to its antecedent his-
tory, but also its own history, the historical assumptions of its own discourse, and the postulates
which condition its own critical gesture. Once those prerequisites are fulfilled – deontologisa-
tion, deabsolutisation, plurivocity – the philosophy of history can therefore possibly assume a 
historical reflexivity which might be interesting for historians. Within projects like conceptual
history (Joachim Ritter), philosophy of historicities (Reinhart Koselleck) or constructive critical 
reflexivity (Jean-Marc Ferry), the major problems that need to be put forward are numerous: 
first, to reveal the assumptions which dominate each use of the concepts by retracing their his-
tory; then, to shed light on the conditions of possibility of historical discourse; to articulate differ-
ent regimes of historicity highlighted by historians; and finally, to think them inside an horizon of 
common meaning. In such a philosophical gesture, more reconstructive than destructive, what
is at stake is to overcome the discontinuity of cultural horizons and the demarcation of national 
and antagonistic histories in order to envisage them in the light of a common history. In this 
regard, critical reflexivity works more within the horizon of a common memory and relies more 
on a history of conciliation than on a history of redemption or of revenge. And it is only within the 
optic of a common truth, with its open-ended horizons, that histories and historical reconstruc-
tions can be antagonistic. History and philosophy can both participate, I assume, in the writing of 
the past, and continue to have a critical function, beyond commitment and reflexivity.
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